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The different sorts of equality are finally inseparable but up to a certain point 
they are sufficiently distinguishable, and one may speak of political equality, equality 
before the laws and economic equality. Without the last, the first and second exist only 
measurably, and they tend to disappear as it shrinks. 
William Dean Howells 
  
RISING ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 
  
hy is the issue of economic inequality so important? Simply 
put, because more unequal societies tend to produce greater 
levels of social dysfunction. They commonly exhibit more 
crime, higher levels of mental illness, more illiteracy, lower life expectancies, 
higher rates of incarceration, lower degrees of civic engagement, higher teenage 
pregnancy rates, diminished social mobility and opportunities, lower levels of 
interpersonal trust, lower levels of general health, and weaker social shock 
absorbers for the poor.1 The issue is not simply one of extremes in wealth and 
poverty. Higher levels of economic inequality create a continuous gradient of 
differential social outcomes throughout the separate income layers within a 
society, so that not only are poor people less healthy than people with middle-
level incomes, but people in the middle are less healthy than those at the top. 
Nor does becoming a wealthier society guarantee proportionally better social 
outcomes simply because of its wealth. Among western industrialized societies, 
social progress in improving the health of its citizens flattens out once a certain 
level in living standards has been obtain; after reaching that level, differences in 
national health outcomes among wealthy countries can be explained not by 
comparative per capita income or wealth levels, but by domestic levels of 
economic egalitarianism. In both Canada and the United States, for example, it is 
the most egalitarian provinces and states, rather than the richest, that are the 
healthiest measured by life expectancy.2  
W
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As well, there is also the issue of economic inefficiencies: widening 
inequalities create macro-economic impediments to growth by excluding certain 
groups from the benefits of an expanding economy, by diminishing the 
purchasing power of the middle and lower income stratums that sustains 
economic growth, by increasing the social costs of policing low-income groups, 
and by having economic and social policy-making captured by wealthy groups 
with all of its resulting misallocations.3    
Canada’s recent history provides a cogent illustration of rising economic 
inequality. The following figure is a table displays the share of aggregate 
incomes going to the entire spectrum of Canadian income earners, who are 
divided up into five income quintiles, from top to bottom, over the years 
between 1951 and 2005. You will notice that, between 1951 and 1981, the bottom 
quintile of income earners improved their share of aggregate income marginally, 
the share of the middle three quintiles grew slightly (with the highest of these 
quintiles receiving all of the increase), and the top income quintile’s share 
declined by 1.2 percentage points. The fruits of the post-war economic boom in 
Canada were distributed in a fashion that primarily benefited the upper end of 
the Canadian middle class, but otherwise marginally compressed the differences 
in income between the top and bottom quintiles. This compression stayed 
relatively stable through these years.  
After 1981, the trend begins to reverse the compression of the initial post-
war years. The share of aggregate national income for the bottom 20 percent 
steadily declines between 1981 and 2000, the middle three quintiles lose almost 5 
percentage points of their share from 1981, and the share claimed by the top 
income quintile jumps more than 5 percentage points. The Organization of 
Economic Co-operation and Development has said that, among its nation 
members, Canada has had the second fastest growth in income inequality since 
the 1990s.4 
 
Figure 1:  
Share of Aggregate Incomes Received by Each  
Quintile of Families and Unattached Individuals (%) 
 
 
Source: L. Osberg, A Quarter Century of Economic Inequality in Canada; 1981-2006 (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for 
Policy Alternatives, 2008), at p. 7. 
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Our next graph, Figure 2, provides a more detailed breakdown of where 
the income shares have been going since the early 1980s, confirming the re-
direction of aggregate income that we witnessed in Figure 1. The income groups 
are now broken down by 5 percent groupings, instead of the 20 percent 
groupings in the last graph. The income gains acquired by the richest quintile, 
which has been the biggest beneficiary of economic redistribution in the recent 
era, have been heavily weighted towards the very top of this quintile. While the 
top 20 percent on individual income earners enjoyed a 17 percent increase in real 
taxable income between 1982 and 2004, the top 10 percent received a 22 percent 
increase, the top 5 percent gathered a 31 percent increase, and the top 1 percent 
acquired an 80 percent increase. (Separate figures which examine the 
compensation of chief executive officers in Canada reinforce this observation. In 
1998, Canada’s top executives earned 106 times as much as the average annual 
employee wage. By 2005, this ratio had grown to 240 times.)5 In contrast, the 
bottom half of the individual income earners on the income spectrum, in terms of 
their share of the expanding pie, lost ground.   
 
Figure 2: 
Percent Change in Real Taxable Income 1982–2004 
 
 
Source: L. Osberg, A Quarter Century of Economic Inequality in Canada; 1981-2006 (Ottawa: Canadian  
Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2008), at p. 9. 
Lynk   128 
 
 
The following graph, Figure 3, provides us with an even clearer 
demonstration of the re-direction of the recent benefits of our economic growth. 
This is an historical graph which illustrates the progression of a specific income 
group between 1920 and 2000 in both Canada and the United States. This graph 
shows the share of annual income going to the top ½ of 1 percent on income 
earners in both countries. Economists choose this particular group because its 
fortunes are illustrative of the pushes and pulls of economic inequality in the 
broader society. The historical fortunes of this top income-earning stratum, both 
upwards and downwards, are remarkably similar in both countries.  
Figure 3 documents that, at the end of the Gilded Age just before 1940, 
the share of national income going to the top 0.5 percent stood at around 13 
percent in both countries, before declining precipitously. The post-war Great 
Compression that followed lasted until the mid-1980s, with the share of income 
going to these groups falling to 5 percent. After the mid-1980s, it began to 
steadily move up again, the United States more dramatically than Canada. By 
2000, the share captured by the richest 0.5 percent in Canada had reached 10 
percent, while in the U.S., their share had climbed back to 13 percent.  
 
Figure 3: 
The Top 0.5% Income Share in Canada and the United States 1920–2000 
 
 
Source: L. Osberg, A Quarter Century of Economic Inequality in Canada; 1981-2006 (Ottawa: Canadian Centre 
for Policy Alternatives, 2008), at p. 26. 
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Figure 4 is from a 2006 Statistics Canada study, and focuses on wealth 
inequality, rather than income inequality. This table tells a similar story to the 
income inequality trends: over the past quarter century, the levels of wealth 
inequality in Canada have widened. Figure 5 divides the population into 
groupings of 10, by income, from bottom to top. Between 1984 and 2005, the 
share of wealth owned by the bottom nine groupings all fell. The only group 
whose share rose was the highest grouping.  
 
Figure 4: 
Share of Total Wealth 
 
 Share 
1984 1999 2005 
All families   % 
Bottom 10% -.05 -.06 -.06 
Second 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Third 0.5 0.4 0.2 
Fourth 1.7 1.3 1.1 
Fifth 3.5 2.8 2.5 
Sixth 5.6 4.7 4.4 
Seventh 8.2 7.4 6.9 
Eighth 11.5 11.0 10.5 
Ninth 17.5 17.4 16.8 
Top 10% 51.8 55.7 58.2 
Source: R. Morissette & X. Zhang, “Revisiting Wealth Inequality”  
(2006), 7:12 Perspectives on Labour and Income (Statistics Canada).  
 
There is one last part of the statistical portrait that I wish to draw before 
leaving this theme. This has to do with the declining share of the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) that has been captured by Canadian wage earners since 1961. As 
Figure 5 shows, labour held almost 57 percent of the GDP in 1961. This rose to a 
peak of 59 percent in 1976, fluctuated between 57 percent to 54 percent in the 
1980s and 1990s, before bottoming out at 53 percent in 2005, its lowest mark in a 
half century. This occurred in the midst of a growing Canadian economy with 
rising labour productivity. This is the sort of economic climate that orthodox 
economic theory would have average wages rising in real dollars to capture a 
greater share of the GDP. And, as labour’s share has been declining, a recent 
study for the Institute for Competitiveness and Prosperity in Ontario has noted 
that corporate profits as a share of GDP are currently at a historical high.6  
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Figure 5: 
Labour's  Share, Canada, Total Compensation as a Share of GDP, 1961-2007  
(current dollars, per cent) 
 
 
Source: A. Sharpe, J-F. Arsenault & P. Harrison, “Why Have Real Wages Lagged behind Labour Productivity 
Growth in Canada?” (2008), 17 International Productivity Monitor 16, at p. 19.  
 
Between 1980 and 2005, labour productivity (the increase in value 
produced by a unit of labour) rose 37 percent, while the growth in real average 
wage levels through this time period was virtually flat. In 2005 constant dollars, 
the average annual salary of a full-time year-round Canadian employee was 
$41,348 in 1980, and it had risen by only $53 in 2005 to $41,403. Had medium 
wages of this worker increased at the same rate as labour productivity (37 
percent), she or he would have been earning $56,800 in 2005.7 As our various 
charts have suggested, whether wages and income rise with productivity is not a 
natural consequence of a free market economy, but rather quite strongly tied to 
the relative bargaining strength of employees. 
 
DECLINING UNIONIZATION LEVELS 
 
In its most recent report on the global workplace, the International 
Labour Organization postulated that a hydraulic relationship exists between 
unionization and inequality. Countries that have higher unionization rates tend 
to have lower economic inequality patterns. And as unionization rates decline, 
inequality levels tend to climb. The International Labour Organization stated that 
recent economic trends show: 
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[…] a clear negative correlation between unionization and inequality: the 
countries in which income inequality is on average lower in the period 1989-2005 
tend to be those in which a greater proportion of workers are affiliated to trade 
unions.8 
 
It is not simply that trade unions raise wages and benefits for their 
members over the prevailing labour market rates, although they do perform this 
task. Rather, the prevailing social science literature tells us that unions have at 
least four significant effects on the labour market and the broader economy that 
contribute to more egalitarian social outcomes. One does not have to be a 
cheerleader for unions to acknowledge the institutional role they have 
historically played in democratizing the economy and stimulating the spread of 
social wealth and rising productivity through the middle and lower income 
stratums.  
First, beyond improving the economic return to their own members, 
unions raise the wages and benefits of non-unionized workers in related 
industries, in part because non-unionized employers seek to dampen the appeal 
of unionization.9 The best example of this can be seen in the Canadian auto and 
auto-parts industries, where the non-unionized Japanese car manufacturers in 
Ontario pay salary rates to their employees that closely parallel those paid to the 
unionized North American auto companies located in Ontario, precisely to 
maintain their non-unionized status. Second, unions tend to raise the wages for 
their lower paid members and compress the overall wages scales within a 
unionized workplace, so that the lowest paid workers rise in relative terms and 
the wage differentials diminish.10 This not only erodes low income levels in the 
unionized labour force – in 2002, a third of Canadian non-union workers were 
defined as low paid, but only eight per cent of unionized workers were so 
classified – but it also works to improve the economic well-being of historically 
disadvantaged groups such as women and visible minorities, who are 
disproportionately found at the lower end of the Canadian labour market.11    
A third significant contribution of unions towards greater economic 
egalitarianism has been to dampen the differential levels between executive pay 
and the wage rates in the mainstream labour force. A 2007 study has concluded 
that unionized firms generally pay lower levels of total CEO compensation than 
non-unionized firms, with an increasing impact upon the very highest executive 
levels.12 And fourth, unions in a dense-enough clustering within a society 
increase the influence of other social forces – such as non-governmental 
organizations, liberal religious institutions, academics, policy forums and critical 
journalism – in favour of more egalitarian economic policies of redistribution. 
The recent ILO study that I quoted above has found that unionization levels are 
closely linked with broader virtuous social circles: 
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The countries where union density rates are higher are also the ones in which 
union benefits are more generous, the taxation system is more progressive, 
collective bargaining more centralized and labour law is closer to international 
norms and better implemented.13 
 
Thus, unions perform at the macro-social level what they also do at the 
workplace and sectoral level: compress overall wages and benefits, lift up the 
bottom, spread out the middle and dampen down the top.14 In a recent study, the 
World Bank has said that this has been accomplished without impairing national 
economic performance or social prosperity.15   
All of these features were certainly true during the halcyon days of the 
Great Compression. They remain true today, but in a distinctly more diminished 
fashion. In recent years, the unionization levels throughout most of the advanced 
industrialized world have been steadily eroding.  In many of these countries, 
unions reached their apex in terms of density in the 1970’s and 1980’s and have 
been sliding down since. In Canada, declining unionization rates have been cited 
as a significant contributing factor to falling average wages and shrinking 
pension benefit coverage among workers,16 which in turn contribute to widening 
inequality.      
Figure 6 illustrates that the unionization rate in Canada has been falling 
steadily since the mid-1980s, just as the economic inequality levels in the country 
were beginning to rise.  What the prior table on comparative union density rates 
did not tell us about Canada is that union membership (as a percentage of the 
total workforce) rose from 32 per cent in 1970 to as high as 38 per cent by 1981, 
before its steady decline to the 2007 figure of 29 per cent. Private sector 
unionization in Canada has diminished even farther, sliding from 29 per cent in 
1981 to 17 percent today. If it had not been for the high and fairly stable 
unionization levels in the public sector – approximately 71 percent of public 
workers are union members – the decline would have been much greater. Both 
the 29 percent overall unionization rate and the 17 percent rate in the private 
sector are the lowest figures since the 1950’s.17 Keep in mind that this decline has 
occurred even as Canadian unions were significantly increasing the number of 
new members in their ranks: between 1997 and 2007, union membership grew by 
almost 19 percent in absolute numbers, but with total employment rising by 
almost 25 per cent, the density of unions slumped.18  
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Figure 6: 
Trends in Union Membership and Density 
 
 
Source: P. Kumar, “Whither Unionism: Current State and Future Prospects of Union Renewal in Canada” 
(Kingston, Ont.: Industrial Relations Centre, 2008, Discussion Paper # 2008-04)  
 
Another way to illustrate the relationship between declining unionization 
rates and rising economic inequality in Canada is to compare these rates at the 
provincial level. This is a helpful measurement, as provinces have sufficient 
governmental jurisdiction within Confederation over social and, to a lesser 
degree, economic policy-making to be able to contribute, positively or negatively, 
to their economic inequality levels. Using 1998 statistics (the most recent useful 
comparative figures available), Figure 7 lists the 10 provinces with their 
unionization levels on the left-hand column and their inequality ratios (based on 
their after-tax income upper and lower quintile ratios) on the right, with their 
respective rankings in brackets.   
Figure 7 tells us that, as a distinct trend, the provinces with the highest 
unionization rates have also been the most egalitarian as measured by their 
inequality levels. With the Canadian after-tax inequality ratio average set at 5.40, 
the five provinces with the highest unionization levels (Newfoundland, Quebec, 
Manitoba, British Columbia and Saskatchewan) were all below the national 
inequality ratio, while three of the provinces with the lowest unionization rates 
(Alberta, Ontario and Nova Scotia) are at or above the national ratio for 
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inequality. (Prince Edward Island and New Brunswick, the smallest and third 
smallest provinces by population, are statistical outliers.)  
 
Figure 7: 
Comparative Provincial Unionization Levels and After-Tax Inequality Ratios 
 
Province Unionization Rate, and Rank 
 – 1998 
After Tax Inequality Ratio  
of Highest and Lowest 
Quintiles, and Rank – 1998 
Newfoundland 39.7%  (1) 4.90  (4) 
Prince Edward Island 26.3%  (9) 4.20  (1) 
Nova Scotia 28.9%  (6) 5.40  (8) 
New Brunswick 26.6%  (8) 4.90  (4) 
Quebec 35.7%  (2) 4.90  (4) 
Ontario 28.0%  (7) 5.50  (9) 
Manitoba 34.9%  (3) 4.70  (3) 
Saskatchewan 33.6%  (5) 4.60  (2) 
Alberta 23.0%  (10) 6.10  (10) 
British Columbia 34.8%  (4) 5.10  (7) 
National Average 
 
30.7% 5.40 
Sources: R. Morissette, G. Schellenberg & A. Johnson, “Diverging Trends in Unionization” (2005) 6:4 Perspective 
on Labour and Income (Statistics Canada) 5, Table 3, at p. 8; and D. Sanga, “Income Inequality within Provinces” 
(Winter 2000), 12:4 Perspectives on Labour and Income (Statistics Canada) 33, at p. 35.   
 
STAGNATING LABOUR LAWS    
 
Legislatively, the past 25 years in Canada has been a period of labour law 
retrenchment. Since the mid-1980s, the provincial legislatures have enacted, 
more commonly than not, statutory provisions on union certification and the 
protection of collective bargaining that have made union organizing and 
negotiating more difficult.19 Chief among these amendments have been the 
change in six jurisdictions, including three of the four largest provinces by 
population, from a card-count certification process to a mandatory election 
process when determining whether a union has the majority support of the 
employees in a workplace for representational purposes. Much less frequently 
over this time period have been the occasions when labour laws have been 
amended to protect or enhance the organizing capabilities of unions. And even 
when many of these enhancements occurred – British Columbia in 1992, Ontario 
in 1993 and Saskatchewan in 1994 – they were rolled back by subsequent 
governments.20 It may well be that some of the initial labour law reforms that 
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strengthened unions were poorly thought out, or packaged in such a way as to 
unwittingly invite a fierce counter-reaction.21 But with greater certainty, it can 
also be said that the conservative political trend which has been antithetical to 
unions at both the provincial and federal levels in Canada has shaped the recent 
legislature climate towards industrial relations. Whatever the preferred 
explanation, the unmistakable trend in recent years has been towards the 
statutory diminishment of the vitality of our labour laws.  
This should concern us all. Labour and employment rights and the laws 
that buttress them are not the accumulation of privileges by a vigourous lobby of 
special interests, but the expression of core constitutional and human rights that 
benefit, directly and indirectly, the majority of citizens living in a modern 
democratic society. At the international level, the three foundational documents 
of the International Bill of Rights – the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,22 
the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,23 and the 
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights24 – all promote the right of 
employees to a collective voice at work as a fundamental human rights 
guarantee. At the national level, the Canadian Parliament has stated that 
collective bargaining is a positive social good which ensures that the benefits of 
economic growth are fairly distributed to all.25 And constitutionally, the Supreme 
Court of Canada has recognized the importance of collective bargaining by 
sheltering it within our Charter of Rights and Freedoms.26  
In this last part of the Lecture, I want to focus on one area of concern, 
respecting union certification, which I think is illustrative of the worrisome 
legislative trends in Canada in recent times respecting our labour laws. Because 
of our limited time, other patterns that could also have been usefully explored 
are not, such as the regular reliance by Parliament and the provincial legislatures 
on back-to-work legislation to end lawful strikes,27 or the dogged refusal by some 
Canadian governments to extend collective bargaining to specific occupational 
groups, such as police officers working for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police28 
or Ontario agricultural workers.29  
Prior to 1984, the federal jurisdiction and nine of the ten provinces 
utilized the card-check system in their labour legislation.30 Since 1984, five 
provinces have set aside the card-check system and turned to the mandatory 
secret ballot process: British Columbia (which adopted the mandatory 
certification election process in 1984; reverted to the card-check process in 1992, 
and returned to mandatory elections in 2002); Alberta (1988); Newfoundland 
(1994); Ontario (1995); and Saskatchewan (2008).31 In each case, the legislative 
changes were driven not by any evidence-based studies which found that the 
card-check system was functionally deficient in measuring majority employee 
support, nor by a rational selection from among different rights-enhancing 
industrial relations models. Rather, the most likely explanation is that these 
changes were the ideological preference of provincial governments led by parties 
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with an antipathy towards collective workplace rights and other equalizing 
institutions. The unspoken expectation of these governments was that a 
mandatory election process for union certification would result in lowered 
unionization rates. And these expectations have been borne out. In 2004, the five 
provinces that required mandatory certification elections at that time had a 
combined unionization rate of 30.5 percent, which was almost 14 percent lower 
than the 34.7 percent average unionization rate for the five provinces that did 
employ the card-check process.32   
The steadily shifting political preference by conservative provincial 
governments for the mandatory election process has prompted a number of 
Canadian industrial relations academics to investigate the impact of these 
changes on unionization levels. The two most common provincial laboratories 
for these social scientists have been Ontario and British Columbia. In recent 
times, both provinces have experienced political pendulum swings, with liberal 
or social democratic governments maintaining or enacting the card-check 
method, and conservative governments legislating mandatory certification 
elections. The advantage of these pendulum swings is that they have given social 
scientists a relatively rich amount of certification data to quantify and compare 
the contributions of both methods to relative unionization levels in the specific 
time periods.  
Ontario has been frequently studied on this issue. The province’s labour 
legislation had a card-check system since the late 1940s, through Progressive 
Conservative (1947-85), Liberal (1985-90) and New Democratic Party (1990-1995) 
governments. Significant labour law reforms were enacted by the NDP in 1993 
which maintained the card-check approach, but enhanced other aspects of the 
certification process. The election of the Progressive Conservative government in 
1995 saw major changes to the Ontario Labour Relations Act, including the 
introduction of mandatory certification elections for the first time in Ontario. The 
Liberal government that came to office in 2003 has maintained the mandatory 
election system, with the exception that the card-count process was restored for 
the construction industry.  
There have been four leading academic investigations into the 
comparative impact of the two different certification-determination methods in 
Ontario’s recent history. Each of them has found that the card-check process 
measurably enhanced the certification success and activity rates of unions, while 
the mandatory elections provisions stunted union representation efforts.    
Felice Martinello, in research published in 2000, concluded that the 
combined effect of the NDP government in the early 1990s and its labour law 
reforms resulted in a significant increase in union certification activity and 
success rates, while the subsequent PC government and its labour legislation 
resulted in a marked decrease in certification activity and success rates.33 Two 
years later, Susan Johnson’s investigation focused expressly on the change from 
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card-check to mandatory elections. Similar to Martinello, she found that the post-
1995 legislative switch to elections had a substantial downward impact on union 
certification success rates. Johnson also extended her analysis to a cross-country 
review, and concluded that mandatory vote provisions among the various 
provinces reduced the union certification success rates by nine percent.34 Sara 
Slinn in 2004 found that the introduction of mandatory certification votes in 1995 
had “a highly significant negative impact” upon the probability of certification 
success for unions in Ontario, amounting to a 21 percent lower likelihood of 
certification under the mandatory vote procedure.35 And Timothy Bartkiw’s 2008 
published research supported these earlier findings, leading him to conclude that 
“labour laws continue to matter despite shifts in economic internationalization 
and industrial structure.”36 
Similar results have been found in the British Columbia context. Chris 
Riddell has shown that from the late 1970s up until 1984, the union certification 
success rate under the card-check process was in the high 80 percent and low 90 
percent range. Mandatory certification elections were introduced in 1984, and the 
success rate tumbled to the 70 percent range until 1993, when the card-check 
process was re-introduced through labour legislation reforms under a new 
provincial government. The certification success rate returned to the 90 percent 
level almost immediately and remained there until 2002, when another 
government re-introduced the mandatory election procedure and the rates fell 
back to the 70 percent level.37 Professor Riddell also found that employer tactics 
to suppress union certification efforts have been twice as effective under 
mandatory election laws as under the card-check process, suggesting that 
certification elections create an environment more conductive to anti-union 
tactics.38   
These findings are both worrisome and reassuring. On the one hand, they 
should trouble us, because the recent legislative trends to blunt the effectiveness 
of labour law demonstrates that Canada’s decades-old international human 
rights commitments to protect and enhance the collective voice of employees in 
the workplace have not yet become broadly accepted among our political classes. 
But, on the other hand, these findings provide an odd reassurance. If labour laws 
do play a prominent role in increasing or decreasing the levels of unionization 
within a province or a country, then we retain the capability as political actors to 
respond meaningfully to the economic forces in front of us. We are not just the 
objects of invisible hands, but also the subjects of our own destiny.  
 
NOTES 
                                                 
* This is a much shortened excerpt from the Ivan Cleveland Rand Memorial Lecture that I gave at the 
Faulty of Law, University of New Brunswick on 5 February 2009. The full Lecture is available 
through a free download at:  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1411700. The full 
Lecture has also been published at: (2009), 59 University of New Brunswick Law Journal 14-41.  
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